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CoRPoRATIONs-Oi::i::rCERs AND DIRECTORs-1.IABn.ITY FOR R:BALIZING LEss 
T:s:AN FuLL V ALOE FROM SALE OF CoRPORATB AssETS ON DrssoLunoN-The 
defendants were directors, officers, and sole stockholders of a corporation engaged 
in the business of wholesaling electrical supplies. The business gradually 
declined until the corporation was no longer able to meet maturing obligations, 
even though expenses had been cut to a minimum. After trying unsuccess-
fully to borrow more money the defendants decided to wind up the business. 
Faced with several possible methods of liquidation, they chose to sell the 
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assets at an open auction sale. The net proceeds of the sale were about $20,000, 
while the cost of the inventory had been at least $60,000. The creditors, 
through the trustee in bankruptcy, sued the directors for waste of the assets 
under the New York statute.1 The appellate division decided that there had 
been waste, for the directors had not given the required notice to the creditors 
of the sale and bad not realized full value for the assets. On appeal, held, 
affirmed, two judges dissenting. While notice to the creditors is not required, 
directors must respond in damages for the amount, if any, by which less than 
full value is realized from the liquidation sale of a corporation's assets. New 
York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau., Inc. 17, Weiss, 305 N.Y. I, llO N.E. 
(2d) 397 (1953). 
It is universally held that officers and directors of a corporation have a 
£duciary relationship to that corporation and its stockholders.2 This is often 
termed a relationship of trustee and cestui que trust3 or of principal and agent. 4 
Most jurisdictions hold that officers and directors do not have this fiduciary 
obligation to creditors when the corporation is solvent,5 but declare that when 
a corporation becomes insolvent, a trust relationship arises between creditor 
and director.0 Because of this fiduciary duty to the corporation, stockholders, 
or creditors, the director is liable for acts tinged with bad faith, 7 fraud, 8 or 
culpable negligence.9 In the principal case the court was satisfied that the 
directors had not acted in bad faith or perpetrated a fraud, but apparently 
held that they were negligent as a matter of law if they could not prove they 
had gotten full value for the assets. This decision was made despite the 
general rule that the negligence of directors in suits for waste of corporate 
1 "An action may be brought against one or more of the directors or officers of a cor-
poration to procure judgment for the following relief or any part thereof: ••• 2. To compel 
them to pay to the corporation, or to its creditors, any money and the value of any property, 
which they have acquired to themselves, or transferred to others, or lost, or wasted, by or 
through any neglect of or failure to perform or other violation of their duties," 22 N.Y. 
Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1943) §60. 
2Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. (2d) 405, 241 P. 
(2d) 66 (1952); Des Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. George M. Bechtel & Co., 243 Iowa 
1007, 51 N.W. (2d) 174 (1952); Burnes National Bank v. Mueller-Keller Candy Co., (8th 
Cir. 1936) 86 F. (2d) 252. 
3 Commercial Banking and Trust Co. v. Tenant's Realty Co., 37 Ohio App. 566, 175 
N.E. 36 (1930); National Drama Corp. v. Burns, 183 N.Y.S. 739 (1920). 
4Mathews v. Fort Valley Cotton Mills, 179 Ga. 580, 176 S.E. 505 (1934). 
G Conway v. Bonner, (5th Cir. 1939) 100 F. (2d) 786; Whitfield v. Kern, 122 N.J. 
Eq. 332, 192 A. 48 (1937); Wilson v. Stevens, 129 Ala. 630, 29 S. 678 (1901). 
O Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Wood, 97 Fla. 493, 121 S. 789 (1929); City National 
Bank v. Goshen Woolen Mills Co., 35 Ind. App. 562, 69 N.E. 206 (1903); Mica Products 
Co. v. Heath, 81 N.H. 470, 128 A. 805 (1925); Shoenthal v. New Jersey Gardens Co., 
(N.J. 1918) 103 A. 415; Olney v. Conanicut Land Co., 16 R.I. 597, 18 A. 181 (1889). 
7 Angelus Securities Corp. v. Ball, 20 Cal. App. (2d) 423, 67 P. (2d) 152 (1937); 
Gordon v. Pendleton, 202 N.C. 241, 162 S.E. 546 (1932). 
8 Van Antwerp Realty Corp. v. Cooke, 230 Ala. 535, 162 S. 97 (1935); Prudential 
Trust Co. v. McCarter, 271 Mass. 132, 171 N.E. 42 (1930). 
9 Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 11 S.Ct. 924 (1891); Flynn v. Third National 
Bank, 122 Mich. 642, 81 N.W. 572 (1900); Union National Bank v. Hill, 148 Mo. 380, 
49 s.w. 1012 (1899). 
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assets is ultimately a question of fact to be determined under all the circum-
stances, and goes to the jury unless only one inference can be drawn from the 
facts.10 The degree of negligence necessary to hold a director liable for waste 
varies in different states. Some jurisdictions require no less than gross neg-
ligence, at least when the directors serve without compensation.11 Others 
require the care an ordinarily prudent director would use in a similar business.12 
The third and most strict rule makes the director liable if he fails to use the 
care which businessmen of ordinary prudence exercise in their own affairs.13 
New York adheres to this last view.14 Under none of these three theories 
is a director or officer held liable for a mistake of judgment,16 and New York 
itself has gone so far as to say that a director will not be held liable even 
though the error was so gross as to show unfitness to manage corporate affairs.16 
In the light of the negligence and mistake rule in New York it seems that 
interpreting the statute as requiring that full value be obtained for the assets 
is unreasonable, for the directors are being held liable for a mistake of business 
judgment.17 It appears that the directors chose to auction the assets in the 
belief that it would be an inexpensive way to liquidate and did so only after 
consultation with an attorney and use of reasonable judgment. The court 
indicates that the directors were required only to act without improvident waste 
and need not have given notice to the creditors of the sale. However, it seems 
to say that the directors caused improvident depletion of the assets if they 
failed to get full value for them. In its interpretation of the statute the 
court does not apply the New York negligence rule on waste and thus does 
not take into account the fact that since the directors were the sole stockholders, 
it is especially likely that they would act with the care which a businessman 
of ordinary prudence uses in his own affairs.18 From the cases relied upon in 
10 3 FLETCHER, CYc. CoBP., penn. ed., §1030 (1947). 
11 Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 292 Mass. 1, 197 N.E. 649 (1935); Van Antwetp 
Realty Corp. v. Cooke, note 8 supra; Jones v. Johnson, 86 Ky. 530, 6 S.W. 582 (1888). 
12pool v. Pool, (La. 1945) 22 S. (2d) 131; Anderson v. Bundy, 161 Va. 1, 171 S.E. 
501 (1933); Atherton v. Anderson, (6th Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 883. 
. 13 Strauss v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., (4th Cir. 1933) 63 F. (2d) 174; Martin 
v. Hardy, 251 Mich. 413,232 N.W. 197 (1930); Burkhardt v. Smith, 161 Md. 398, 157 
A. 299 (1931). 
14Kavanaugh v. Gould, 223 N.Y. 103, 119 N.E. 237 (1918); Hanna v. Lyon, 179 
N.Y. 107, 71 N.E. 778 (1904); General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 215 N.Y. 18, 109 N.E. 
96 (1915). 
lG Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S. (2d) 625 (1944); Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 
297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E. (2d) 895 (1937); South Penn Collieries Co. v. Sproul, (3d Cir. 
1931) 52 F. (2d) 557; Fagerberg v. Phoenix Flour Mills Co., 50 Ariz. 227, 71 P. (2d) 
1022 (1937). 
16Everett v. Phillips, 26 N.Y.S. (2d) 881, 43 N.E. (2d) 18 (1941); Jersawit v. 
Kaltenbach, 1 N.Y.S. (2d) 756 (1938). 
17 This is essentially the position taken by Desmond, J., in his dissent in the principal 
case. Contra: 17 A:r.B~ L. R.Ev. 301 (1953); 66 HAnv. L. R.Ev. 1526 (1953); 39 VA. L. 
REv. 690 (1953). 
18 In re Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 11 (1872). This case, though not applying the 
general rule used in New York, does suggest that directors who are also stockholders would 
naturally be more careful in their operation of the business than would directors who own 
no stock. The idea seems peculiarly well adapted to the principal case. 
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the majority opinion it would seem that the court ignored the orthodox concept 
of a director's fiduciary obligation,19 and held the directors to a much higher 
standard of care than is usually applied to them in New York or any other 
jurisdiction. 
Howard N. Thiele, Jr. 
19 The only three cases cited in the majority opinion are Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 
458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) (fiduciary relationship 'between partners in a joint venture); 
Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N.Y. 439, 154 N.E. 303 (1926) (fiduciary relationship 'between 
real estate 'broker and client); Matter of Ryan's Will, 291 N.Y. 376, 52 N.E. (2d) 909 
(1943) (fiduciary relationship 'between trustee and 'beneficiary under a will). 
